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Abstract
In this study, we apply reinforcement learning techniques and pro-
pose what we call reinforcement mechanism design to tackle the dynamic
pricing problem in sponsored search auctions. In contrast to previous
game-theoretical approaches that heavily rely on rationality and common
knowledge among the bidders, we take a data-driven approach, and try
to learn, over repeated interactions, the set of optimal reserve prices. We
implement our approach within the current sponsored search framework
of a major search engine: we first train a buyer behavior model, via a
real bidding data set, that accurately predicts bids given information
that bidders are aware of, including the game parameters disclosed by
the search engine, as well as the bidders’ KPI data from previous rounds.
We then put forward a reinforcement/MDP (Markov Decision Process)
based algorithm that optimizes reserve prices over time, in a GSP-like
auction. Our simulations demonstrate that our framework outperforms
static optimization strategies including the ones that are currently in use,
as well as several other dynamic ones.
1 Introduction
In traditional markets, it is extremely difficult for firms to adjust prices when
they receive more information from consumers. Partially it is because there
exists a menu cost that is physically challenging to change. At the same time,
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even after receiving new information, it is not easy to find the best strategies to
maximize profits.
In this paper, we explore the use of an AI-driven mechanism in which search
engines can dynamically set prices and use the data generated in the process to
maximize the profit.
Selling advertisements online through sponsored search auctions is a proven
profit model for Internet search engine companies such as Google and Baidu.
When a user submits a query in such a search engine, it displays, in the result
page, a few advertisements alongside the organic results, both related to the query.
In the backend, the query triggers an auction mechanism among all advertisers
who are interested in the associated keywords. The advertisers submit bids to
compete for advertising positions on the result page. The search engine then
ranks the advertisers on the result page according to their bids and charges them
only when some one clicks on the advertisement.
The gold-standard mechanism in sponsored search is the well-known gener-
alized second price (GSP) auction [6, 31]. The auctions allocate the best slots
to the advertisers with the highest bids, second best slots to the ones with the
second highest bids, and so on; and charge them based on the bids one slot below
them (or the lowest price for them to maintain the current slot). Major search
engines all adopt some variants of the GSP auction.
A problem with the vanilla GSP auction is that it is not revenue optimal,
according the seminal theory attributed to Myerson [20, 24]. It is known that,
under standard game theory assumptions, a revenue-optimal auction does not
necessarily allocate the slots by the rank of their bids; it is also known that
in an optimal auction, there exists a vector of advertiser-specific reserve prices
that filter low bids. Over the years, a large body of literature at the interface
of the economics and computation has focused on optimizing revenue of GSP
auctions by incorporating insights (ranking and reserve price) from Myerson’s
theory [12, 25, 22, 13, 29].
1.1 Related works
One objective of many works in this literature is to improve the revenue of GSP
auctions [12, 7, 29, 27]. When designing and analyzing these auctions, most of
these works make the standard game-theoretical assumption that advertisers
have a single parameter called type that indicates their maximum willingness-to-
pay for a single click-through. When evaluating these auctions, these works also
assume that advertisers are rational and will play according to some equilibrium.
While these works shed lights on how to design sponsored search auctions
in theory, the assumptions they make do not generally hold in the practice of
keyword auctions. Most advertisers have complex private information, such
as budget constraints [32, 33, 1], multidimensional valuation, and negative
externalities [5, 9]. Furthermore, private information such as budget may change
dynamically over time and advertisers may not be able to observe all configuration
parameters of the auction.
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There are a few exceptions in the literature that take the initiative to design
and evaluate sponsored auctions by getting rid of these assumptions. Ostrovsky
and Schwarz [22] conduct large field experiments on manually setting different
levels of reserve prices in sponsored search auctions and evaluate these designs.
They show, with A/B tests, that by incorporating discounted Myerson’s reserve
prices, the search engine (Yahoo! in this case) can improve its revenue. However,
it remains unclear about the long-term performance of these auctions since
all these auctions are assumed to be static. It is also unclear how the ad hoc
selection of the reserve prices can be improved. Nekipelov et al. [21] investigate
the problem of estimating the valuations of the advertisers from their bids in
the GSP auction. They get rid of the standard assumption that players must
bid according to equilibrium and make a milder assumption that bidders play
according to some no-regret learning strategy. They characterize the set of
possible valuations given a set of bids.
In the AI community, a recent, interesting line of works aims to tackle the
revenue optimization problem from a dynamic learning perspective. Mohri and
Medina [17, 16] apply learning algorithms to exploit past auctions as well as
user features. Their algorithms mainly focus on the estimation of the underlying
bid distribution, thus depending on the implicit assumption that buyers do not
change their behaviors over time. Mohri and Munoz [19, 18] aim to maximize
advertiser revenue with strategic buyers who aim to maximize their cumulative
discounted surplus. They give online pricing algorithms with desirable regret
bounds. These works assume that there exists an underlying bid or value
distribution for the buyers and it does not change over time.
Battaglini [2] study the Markovian consumer model in a long-term contracting
setting. Their results show that even when the types at different times are highly
persistent, the optimal contract is far from a static one. He et al. [8] and Tian
et al. [30] also assume that buyers have the Markov property. Tian et al. [30]
focuses on buyer behavior prediction and uses a truncated Gaussian distribution
as the transition probability. Their goal is to find the best static mechanism.
They also restrict their buyer model to be a linear combination of several simple
behavior patterns.
1.2 The setting: Baidu’s sponsored search auction design
In this paper, we attempt to relax these unrealistic assumptions and consider an
environment in which bidders can have arbitrarily complex private information
and arbitrary rationality levels that can change dynamically over time. Our goal
is to design dynamic mechanisms that yield competitive revenue in practice in
the long run. While the framework and algorithms proposed in this paper are
applicable to search engines in general, we focus on the sponsored search auction
design of Baidu, the largest search engine in China. We use Baidu as a running
example throughout the paper, calibrating our model with its data.
Baidu sells 3 ad slots for most keywords and like other major search engines,
Baidu runs a GSP-like auction mechanism with reserve prices to sell the slots.
The bidding data yielded by different levels of reserve prices in history provides
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a perfect setting for us to learn how bidders react to different choices of reserve
prices and the number of impressions, and the induced click-through-rates
(CTRs).
2 Preliminaries
We consider an auction design problem in the sponsored search setting. When
a user types a keyword query in a search engine, the search engine (called the
seller hereafter) displays, in the result page, a few advertisements related to
the keyword. We consider auctions of a single keyword, where there are N
bidders competing for K slots. The seller allocates the slots by an auction,
and each bidder i reports a bid bi to the seller. A bid profile is denoted by
b “ pb1, b2, . . . , bN q. We slightly abuse notations and use bi to refer to both
bidder i and his advertisement.
In a standard game-theoretical model, there is a single-dimensional type for
each bidder that denotes the maximum amount of money that the bidder is
willing to pay. However, we do not explicitly emphasize such a value in our
model. The reason is two-fold: first, our model does not assume that the bidders
are fully rational or rational according to some metric. Second, there are many
factors that may affect bidders’ bidding behavior, so explicitly define one such
parameter that we cannot observe does not help much in end-to-end training.
These are also the reasons why our bidder behavior model is defined over the
bidders’ observations and past bidding data, instead of their private information.
In fact, this kind of data-driven model is not uncommon in the literature (cf.
e.g., [8, 32, 23]).
2.1 Generalized second price auction
Upon receiving a search query, the seller needs to determine a slot allocation and
payment vector. Formally, a mechanism consists of two functionsM “ px, pq,
where the allocation rule x is a function x : RN Ñ r0, 1sN , which takes as input
the bid profile and outputs an N -dimensional vector indicating the quantity of
items allocated to each bidder; and the payment rule p is a function p : RN Ñ RN
that maps the bid profile to an N -dimensional non-negative vector specifying
the payment of each bidder.
We consider the GSP auction that are widely adopted by major search
engines. Suppose there are N bidders competing for K advertising slots. The K
slots have different effects of attracting user clicks (described by their CTRs).
Denote by qk the CTR of the k-th slot and assume that qk is non-increasing with
respect to the position of the slot, i.e. q1 ě q2 ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě qK ě 0. Upon receiving a
keyword query, the seller first collects the bid profile b from the bidders. Usually,
each bidder is associated with a reserve price ri, which is the minimum quantity
that bidder i needs to bid in order to enter the auction. Denote by bpiq the i-th
highest bid among those above the reserve prices. The seller then sequentially
allocates the i-th slot to bidder bpiq, until either the slots or the bidders run
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out. When bidder bpiq’s advertisement is clicked by a user, the seller charges the
bidder according to the following rule:
ppiq “
#
max
 
qi`1bpi`1q{qi, rpiq
(
if bpi`1q exists;
rpiq otherwise.
The reserve price profile r can significantly affect the revenue of the advertising
platform. In this paper, we view the reserve price profile r as the main parameters
of the mechanism. The seller’s goal is to set reserve price profiles dynamically to
maximize its revenue.
3 Our approach
3.1 Markov bidder model
We assume that the bidders’ behavior has time-homogeneous Markov property.
Denote by sptqi and h
ptq
i the bid distribution of bidder i and the KPIs (key
performance indicators) received by bidder i at time step t. Then the bid
distribution of bidder i at the next time step is a function of sptqi and h
ptq
i :
s
pt`1q
i “ gipsptqi , hptqi q
Such a Markov model is not uncommon in the literature, see [8, 2]. Our
experiences with Baidu also indicate that the Markov model aligns with the
bidders’ behaviors.
3.2 Reinforcement mechanism design
The bids of the N bidders are drawn from their bid distributions. We make
the assumption that the individual bids are independent of each other. While
such an assumption loses generality, it is in fact quite commonly used in the
literature [16, 8]. The joint bid distribution is
spt`1q “
Nź
i“1
s
pt`1q
i “
Nź
i“1
gipsptqi , hptqi q “ gpsptq, hptqq
For simplicity, we assume that the number of daily queries of each keyword
is a constant. Thus, the KPI hptq is determined by both the bid distribution sptq
and the reserve price profile rptq. We view sptq as the state of the seller and rptq
as its action, and formulate the long-term revenue maximization problem as an
MDP.
Definition 1. The long-term revenue maximization problem is a Markov decision
process pN , S,R,G,REV ps, rq, γq, where
• N is the set of bidders with |N | “ N .
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• S “ S1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ SN is the state space, where Si is the set of all possible bid
distributions of bidder i;
• R “ R1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆRN is the action space, where Ri is the set of all possible
reserve prices that the mechanism designer can set for bidder i;
• G “ pg1, g2, . . . , gN q is the set of state transition functions;
• REV ps, rq is the immediate reward function that gives the expected revenue
for setting reserve price profile r when the state is s;
• γ is the discount factor with 0 ă γ ă 1.
The objective is to select a sequence of reserve price profiles trtu that maxi-
mizes the sum of discounted revenues:
OBJ “
8ÿ
t“1
γtREV pst, rtq
3.3 Summary of the Framework
Figure 1 shows the main framework of our model. Our model contains two parts:
1. Mechanism, where the bidders interact with the seller’s action (reserve prices)
and get KPIs as feedbacks; 2. Markov bidder model, which determines how
bidders adjust their bids according to the KPI feedbacks.
Bidders
Search Engine
Optimization
Algorithm
(time step t)
Mechanism
Bidders
Search Engine
Optimization
Algorithm
(time step t` 1)
Mechanism
bids KPIs
reserve
prices
bids KPIs
reserve
prices
Bidder model
Figure 1: Model framework
4 Implementation
In this section, we describe how we implement our model in the Baidu sponsored
search context and solve the optimization problem.
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4.1 Bidder model: LSTM-RNN
In our model, each bidder is a function gi that takes as input the bid distribution
s
ptq
i and the KPIs of the bidder h
ptq
i , and outputs the bidder’s bid distribution
of the next time step. We discretize the distribution to 100 non-overlapping
intervals. To fit the function gi, we implement a standard Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network with 128 units via TensorFlow. We
set the unit time step to be 1 day. The inputs of the network include KPIs of four
consecutive days, the bid distributions for the bidder and also some time-specific
features.
We choose the main KPIs in the system such as the number of impressions,
the number of clicks and the amount of payments and take logarithm of some of
the features and encode them using tile-coding. The reason of taking logarithm
is based on our observation that most bidders care about the relative changes of
the KPIs rather than their absolute values.
4.2 Optimization algorithm: Monte Carlo Tree Search
Although an optimal reserve pricing scheme exists according to the MDP theory,
its exact computation is formidably costly due to the following reasons:
• The possible reserve profiles of our optimization problem grows exponen-
tially with respect to the number of the bidders;
• The number of future states to explore is exponential with respect to the
searching depth.
We circumvent the first difficulty by restricting attentions to the keywords
that contain only a few major bidders. We focus on the keywords with thin
markets (few major bidders) mainly because the effect of reserve prices diminishes
in thick markets anyway. To tackle the second one, we only explore possible
actions for a bidder to be in a small neighborhood of the current reserve price.
This restriction is also necessary for practical stability concerns, since sudden
changes in reserve prices would result in sudden changes in bidders’ KPIs, which
would hurt the stability of the advertising platform. With these restrictions, the
size of the action space is greatly reduced to a small subset. To further speed up
the search, we implement the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm [10, 4].
The MCTS algorithm is an exploration algorithm to evaluate available action
values at current state by running simulations. The MCTS algorithm maintains
a tree structure, with its root representing the current MDP state. It updates
the state values by repeatedly simulating available actions. Though MCTS can
be replaced by any other suitable optimization algorithm in our framework, our
main reason to use MCTS is that
• The state space (bid distribution) has uncountably many states, therefore
it would be impossible to apply the traditional MDP algorithm (value
iteration or policy iteration [3]). Even discretization does not help because
it still has formidable high dimensions.
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• Though deep reinforcement learning grows fast in recent year and succeeds
in numerous scenarios, it is inappropriate to train a deep neural network
in our setting, i.e. deep Q-learning network(DQN) [14] or asynchronous
advantage actor-critic (A3C) [15]. The reason is that a deep neural network
depends highly on the bidder behavior model. However, the agents may
leave and enter freely in a highly dynamic environment such as ours. In
addition, we do not have reasonable estimations of the Q-value for each
state and action, which will slow down the training process.
4.3 Description of Algorithm
Our MCTS algorithm starts with the root node, which represents the current
state. It simulates available actions repeatedly before selecting the best one. In
each simulation, the MCTS algorithm selects an action (child node) according to
some selection rule and estimates the immediate reward. This procedure goes on
until the some maximum depth is reached. Then the algorithm back-propagates
the immediate rewards to the root node and update the corresponding long-term
reward.
To estimate the expected immediate reward for an action, we simulate the
corresponding auctions repeatedly and normalize the revenue according to the
average number of queries for the keyword.
In general, our MCTS algorithm contains three separate parts.
4.3.1 Selection
We use Upper Confidence bounds for Trees (UCT) as selection strategy [11]. In
UCT, we uniformly select an action until each action at a given state is select
once. Then the following action is select as
a “ arg max
a
˜
node.Qs,a ` cp
d
lnpnode.nsq
node.na
¸
where node.ns is the number of times we visit node, node.na is the number we
select action a previously, node.Qs,a is the current estimation of expected long
term value for taking action a, cp can be regard as the parameter to balance
exploration and exploitation. We set cp “
?
2 and scale the reward to the
interval r0, 1s.
4.3.2 Expansion and Simualtion
During the process of exploration, more nodes are added to the tree in the
expansion stage.
Upon selecting a specific action to explore, simulation is performed to derive
the reward of the action and the state of the following node.
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4.3.3 Backpropagation
Various backpropagate strategy have been develop in reinforcement learning
setting [28]. In our backpropagation algorithm, we apply SARSApλq [26], which
use λ-return to update state action value. To be more specific, the return sample
is computed as
Rst,rt “
L´1ÿ
n“0
wnR
n
st,at
where wn satisfies
wn “
"p1´ λqλn 0 ď n ă L´ 1
λL´1 L´ 1
Our back-propagation algorithm are stated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Back-propagation Algorithm for λ-return
Input: Sample Path: path
q “ 0
for t “ L´ 1; t ą 0; tÐ t´ 1 do
pnode, a, rq Ð pathrts
node.ns Ð node.ns ` 1,
node.na Ð node.na ` 1
q Ð q ` r, δQ Ð q ´ node.Qs,a
node.Qs,a Ð node.Qs,a ` pδQ{node.saq
q Ð p1´ λqmaxa‹|node.na‹‰0rnode.Qs,a‹s ` λq
5 Simulations
In this section, we describe how we compare different algorithms by simulation
based on real data from Baidu. We extract 8 months’ bidding data from Baidu,
and selected 400 keywords1 that meet the following conditions:
• The number of daily queries for the keyword is large and stable (with small
variance).
• The most part (at least 80%) of the revenue of the keyword is contributed
by at most 3 bidders.
For each keyword, we only focus on the 3 major bidders and ignore others.
For each bidder, we trained a recurrent neural network using the 8 months’ data
and use cross entropy as the performance indicator for the network. We use 10%
of all data as the test set. The average cross entropy among all bidders and all
test instances is 1.67. Some selected test instances are listed in Figure 2.
1Our dataset is considerably larger than in most papers in the literature. For example, [21]
conduct experiments based on 1 week’s data from 9 bidders and the dataset for simulations
in [12] contains only 1 keyword.
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Figure 2: Prediction results for 4 selected bidders. Each sub-figure contains two
distributions, with the upper one being the actual distribution and the lower
one being the prediction. The cross entropy of each sub-figure is shown on top.
We explore possible reserve prices for the bidder to be 95%, 100% and 105%
times the current reserve price for the bidder. We set λ “ 0.8 and the search
depth to be 5 in our optimization algorithm. In the selection step, we restrict the
number of exploration to be 5000. In the expansion step, to estimate the revenue
at the selected node, we simulate the auction 5 million times and compute the
average revenue as the per-impression revenue of each keyword.
We set the initial reserve price to be p “ arg maxb bp1 ´ F pbqq where F pbq
is the current bid distribution. We call this reserve price static optimal, since
this price maximizes the revenue if the bidders do not change their bids. Several
algorithms are compared by our simulations:
• STATIC_OPT: Always use the initial reserve.
• GREEDY: In each round, we randomly choose a bidder and change his
reserve price by ´5% and simulate auctions for the next period, if the
revenue for the next period goes up, then use this reserve price. Otherwise,
change his reserve price by `5%. Notice this method can been seen as a
simplified version of coordinate gradient descend(ascend) method.
• BAIDU: Current reserve prices used by Baidu.
• STATIC_50: 50 cents as the reserve prices for all bidders, regardless of
bid distribution.
We also compare the effect of different frequencies of changing reserve prices
by setting the time step ∆t in the expansion step of the optimization algorithm2.
Clearly, changing the reserve prices too frequently can affect the stability of the
platform and thus is not desirable. In this simulation, we only compare the
performance of our framework.
2This time step is not necessarily equal to the time step for training the Markov bidder
model. We can always simulate bidder behaviors day by day but change the reserve every
several days
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5.1 Results and analysis
In the first simulation, we change the reserve every day (time step ∆t “ 1) in
our MCTS algorithm, and compare it with other strategies mentioned above.
We simulate 120 days for each strategies. The results of the simulations are
shown in Figure 3a. Revenue is normalized with the converged value of BAIDU.
The figure shows that
• Our dynamic strategy outperforms all other static strategies (STATIC_OPT,
BAIDU, STATIC_50) as well as the dynamic strategy GREEDY;
• The BAIDU curve converges rapidly within just few days. The reason that
the curve still has a convergence phase is that our simulation is a simplified
version of Baidu’s auction mechanism.
• The STATIC_OPT curve undergoes a rapid rise on the first day and then
followed by a steep fall, also converges after two weeks.
Besides, the simulation also reveals some interesting facts about bidder
behaviors:
• All aggressive pricing schemes gain high revenue immediately and drops
significantly later. This phenomenon is intrinsic for our dataset, since all
the bidders undergo mild pricing mechanism previously due to moderate
choice of reserve prices. The sudden change in reserve price could make
huge immediate reward, but once bidders are aware of the change and
respond accordingly, less revenue can be extracted.
• Although STATIC_OPT could beat mild mechanism like BAIDU and
STATIC_50, its long term revenue is not as promising as the short term.
However, by adopting dynamic mechanism, we can gradually increase daily
revenue.
• The simulation shows that with more involved optimization algorithm
(such as MCTS) and accurate bidder model, we could achieve the best
performance and gain higher revenue in the long run.
(a) Performance of different strate-
gies
(b) Effect of the frequency of chang-
ing reserve prices
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In the second simulation, we compare the effect of the frequency of changing
reserve prices. The results are shown in Figure 3b. We also simulated 120 days
for each ∆t. the figure indicates that the larger ∆t is, the more revenue it can
extract, and the more quickly it converges. The revenue of ∆t “ 7 is about
several percent small than that of ∆t “ 1, Comparing Figure 3a and 3b, we can
see that the performance GREEDY algorithm is almost the same as the MCTS
algorithm with ∆t “ 3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a dynamic pricing framework, which we call reinforce-
ment mechanism design, that combines reinforcement learning and mechanism
design. Our framework does not depend on unrealistic assumptions adopted
by most theoretical analyses. Interestingly, our framework uses a data-driven
approach to solve a theoretical market-design problem.
Our framework contains two main parts: the bidder-behavior model and the
optimization algorithm. The optimization algorithm finds the optimal mechanism
parameters for each step repeatedly. In each round, the algorithm estimates the
future objectives by simulating the auctions with the bidder-behavior model.
We apply our framework to the sponsored search setting and assume Markov
bidder behavior. The model uses an RNN for the bidder model and an MCTS
algorithm to solve for the optimal reserve prices. Our simulations with real
bidding data from a major search engine in China show that our framework
can dramatically improve the revenue compared to other static and dynamic
strategies.
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